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Some contemporary theorists such as Mazzocchi, Theise and Kafatos are convinced that 
the reformed complementarity may redefine how we might exploit the complexity theory in 21
st
-
century life sciences research. However, the motives behind the profound re-invention of 
―biological complementarity‖ need to be substantiated with concrete shreds of evidence about 
this principle‘s applicability in real-life science experimentation, which we found missing in the 
literature. This paper discusses such pieces of evidence by confronting Bohr‘s complementarity 
and ion channel modeling practice. We examine whether and to what extent this principle might 
assist in developing ion channel models incorporating both deterministic and stochastic 
solutions. According to the ―mutual exclusiveness of experimental setups‖ version of Bohr‘s 
complementarity, this principle is needed when two mutually exclusive perspectives or 
approaches are right, necessary in a particular context, and are not contradictory as they arise in 
mutually exclusive conditions (mutually exclusive experimental or modeling setups).  
A detailed examination of the modeling practice reveals that both solutions are often used 
simultaneously in a single ion channel model, suggesting that the opposite conceptual 
frameworks can coexist in the same modeling setup. We concluded that Bohr‘s complementarity 
might find applications in these complex modeling setups but only through its realistic 
phenomenological interpretation that allows applying different modes of description regardless 
of the nature of the underlying ion channel opening process. Also, we propose the combined use 
of complementarity and Complex thinking in building the multifaceted ion channel models. 
Overall, this paper‘s results support the efforts to establish a more general form of 
complementarity to meet today‘s complexity theory-inspired life sciences modeling demands.  
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Some complexity theorists and philosophers such as Mazzocchi
 
(2010), Theise and 
Kafatos
 
(2013) have recently argued for a new way of using complementarity to reconcile 
opposing conceptual frameworks in biology, hoping to improve biomedical research. According 
to them, the concept of ―biological complementarity‖ indicates that no single research technique 
or theoretical position, or modeling strategy provides a complete account of all biological 
entity‘s features. Instead, these authors hold that the principle of complementarity introduced to 
quantum physics by Niels Bohr in 1928 (Bohr 1928) should occupy a much more important 
place in modern biological research than previously thought. As they see it, complementarity, as 
a relatively old conceptual framework, must embrace numerous complex system features such as 
nonlinearity, emergence, downward causation, multifactorialism, and complex causality. These 
features will not have only a theoretical impact but may pave the way to new medical and 
environmental interventions.  
The inspiration for re-introducing ―biological complementarity‖ these authors found in 
quantum physics where, necessarily in a particular context, two mutually exclusive perspectives 
or approaches are both right and not contradictory (since they arise in mutually exclusive 
situations) (Holton 1988; Roll-Hansen 2000; Grinnell et al. 2002; Camilleri 2007). Niels Bohr 
was the first scientist to use complementarity to bridge quantum physics‘s conceptual framework 
with those used in classical macroscopic physics (Camilleri 2007; Bohr 1928; Bunge 1955a, b). 
Afterward, Bohr‘s complementarity, the most crucial foundational principle of quantum physics, 
inspired physicists Max Delbrück and geneticists Timoféeff-Ressovsky et al. to look for its 
possible use in biology (Timoféeff-Ressovsky et al. 1935; McKaughan 2005; Domondon 2006).  
The search for a general form of complementarity has continued to this day, usually at the 
outskirts of reexamination of quantum experimentation (see, for example, Wootters and Zurek 
1979), including the quantitative understanding and experimental verification of 
complementarity in photonics (see Weston et al. 2013). However, since 2000, there is an 
increasing trend in the number of papers discussing this principle from the point of view of the 
latest experimental physics research findings, according to a quick survey through PubMed, 
Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar. 
A little part of the project was to describe the epistemological implications of the general 
form of complementarity. For instance, Adolf Grunbaum (1957) argued that the resolution of the 
determinism issue in light of physical theory ought to include a philosophical appraisal of the 
principle of complementarity and its generalization. Patricia J. Doty (1958) warned against 
applying generalized complementarity to what she calls secondary, less precise sciences 
(biology, psychology) at all cost, simply because this principle can mislead us to draw erroneous 
conclusions and explanations. On the contrary, Nathan Brody and Paul Oppenheim (1969) 
defended certain parallels between epistemic viewpoints on the mind-body problem and Bohr‘s 
epistemic views in physics. One of the more recent critical intellectual breakthroughs in this field 




2008, 2020). This fresh perspective strongly argued against a longstanding instrumental and 
vague ―classical‖ realist understanding of complementarity.  
 However, to our knowledge, studious reflections on the possibilities of applying this 
principle in biology and medicine were rare in the second half of the 20th century. Among the 
occasional attempts is the one done by biologist Howard H. Patte, who argued that 
complementarity in biology has two significant expressions. One of them is structure-function 
dualism, and the other concerns the relationship between genes and phenotypes (Pattee 1978). 
However, things changed at the beginning of the 21st century as there has been a few attempts to 
revive ―biological complementarity‖. This increased interest coincided with the growing 
adoption of the complex systems view of life.  
Mazzocchi (2010) and Theise and Kafatos (2013) made a
 
noteworthy attempt to re-
actualize complementarity, mainly on the outskirts of their conceptual assessment of complexity-
inspired biomedicine. The shots of these authors to reappropriate ―biological complementarity‖ 
were, in the first place, epistemologically motivated but did not, however, exclude the potential 
that this conceptual tool has to offer when it comes to effective post-reductionist biomedical 
research practice. We hold that the motivation behind the profound re-invention of 
complementarity needs to be corroborated with solid empirical pieces of evidence. However, 
concrete examples from actual research were missing to test the possibilities and limits of 
complementarity in biology, biomedicine and neuroscience. Neuroscience is the perfect field for 
confronting the principles of complementarity and modern research practice. On the other hand, 
various theoretical principles such as complementarity аrе needed to ensure brain research data‘s 
reliability, legitimization, and reproducibility. Therefore, whether, how and, more precisely, to 
what extent this principle may stimulate and facilitate modeling experimentation in neuroscience 
and related biomedical fields requires further clarification.  
On the other hand, simultaneous exploitation of conceptually distinct modeling strategies 
is quite a common practice today. For example, understanding ion channel activity in neuronal 
signal propagation pretty much requires the combined use of deterministic and indeterministic 
solutions, even in the same model (Guckenheimer and Oliva 2002; Austin 2008; Roy and Llinás 
2009). In that sense, it is unclear whether neuroscientists could use complementarity to improve 
their research on neuronal signal propagation, especially considering the longstanding opinion 
that this principle can only be applied to mutually exclusive experimental or modeling setups.  
In this essay we contend that, instead of the ―mutual exclusiveness of experimental 
setups‖ perspective, scientists and philosophers could exploit phenomenological realism to 
appropriate Bohr‘s complementarity principle to meet ion channel modeling demands. Also, our 
goal is to discuss some empirical shreds of evidence from a biological domain that indicate a 
more general form of complementarity. This paper aims to move beyond discussions of 
complementarity‘s theoretical value and evaluate this principle significance to neuroscience from 
a purely practical perspective. The following discussion will begin by exploring some historical 
aspects of introducing complementarity to quantum physics and biology. The third section 




The fourth section will discuss the examples that best reflect the current tendencies in these 
channel models. Finally, in the fifth section, we will answer whether Bohr‘s complementarity 
can be used at the ion channel modeling outskirts. This discussion will enable us to make 
detailed and general comments, conclusions, and recommendations concerning the usefulness of 
complementarity for managing computational neurophysiology practice.  
Before proceeding, we want to stress that our goal in this paper is not to present a new 
account of complementarity neither for physics nor biology or neuroscience. Nor is our goal to 
criticize its long theoretical reach in these disciplines. Instead, here we want to suggest how 
actual neuroscientific practice, or some parts of it, could become accessible for deploying this 
principle. This realization probably opens the doorway for further substantial revision and re-
conceptualization of ―biological complementarity‖.  
 
2 The historical and current reflections on complementarity: From physics to biology 
It is quite a daunting task to discuss complementarity either from a philosophical or 
scientific perspective. As rational beings, we have an inner need to look for reasons why some 
things, concepts, and phenomena go hand in hand while others do not. Perhaps from such a 
constellation of our mind, the idea of complementarity was born. We can only speculate when 
precisely this happened. But what we know with great certainty is when complementarity found 
its place in science. Inspired by the paradoxical dual nature of the light as wave or particle 
depending upon the research method applied, Niels Bohr first publicly announced his view of 
complementarity in quantum mechanics (QM) in 1927 Congress of Physics held in Como, Italy 
(Bohr 1928; Holton 1988; Grinnell et al. 2002; Saunders 2005; Camilleri 2007). According to 
Bohr, complementarity should characterize the connection between the data obtained under 
different experimental conditions and may be interpreted pictorially only based on mutually 
exclusive concepts (Bohr 1928; Holton 1988; Vol‘kensheten 1988). For as Bunge (Bunge 1955a,
 
p. 2) observes: 
            Owing to the fact that complementary aspects are mutually exclusive, it is impossible- 
thus Bohr argues -to afford a single well-defined picture of atomic phenomena, being on 
the other hand, indispensable to split the image of reality into two complementary 
models, or pictures, which can be applied in succession, never simultaneously in all rigor, 
and this simply because the aspects covered by each model are not simultaneously 
observed.  
Bohr‘s scientific appropriation of complementarity was probably under the influence of 
German idealistic philosophy. For instance, Roll-Hansen (2011) and Sloan
 
(2012) argued that 
Bohr‘s physics and philosophy of science could be traced back to Immanuel Kant‘s analysis of 
biological teleology in the second half of the Critique of the Power of Judgment. To be more 
precise, Roll-Hansen contends that it is likely that Harald Høffding‘s historicized Neo-
Kantianism influenced Bohr‘s philosophical thought. According to Sloan (2012), this is still a 




readings and discussions with his philosophical mentor Harald Høffding, or his reading of Kant 
or other sources, or directly from his reflections on these matters. Anyway, how Kant discusses 
and resolves Teleological Judgment‘s antinomy in the central sections of Dialectic has shown 
scientists and philosophers how they should treat conceptual contradictions in both science and 
philosophy. The apparent opposition between a mechanistic and teleological explanation of 
organisms in the manner Kant encountered these in the late eighteenth century - Cartesian-
inspired biological mechanism, Stahlian vitalism, Leibniz-Wolffian teleomechanism, and 
Spinozistic hylozoism - lies in the heart of this antinomy (Sloan 2012). We are not going deeper 
into this subject, but it is possible that German Idealistic philosophy inspired Bohr to seriously 
start using this principle for scientific purposes.  
On this philosophical trail, it might be said that complementarity as a method of 
―description‖ uses two or more mutually exclusive concepts of a specific realm (classical 
physics) to explain a phenomenon of another domain (quantum physics) that cannot be entirely 
defined by any one of these concepts (Bunge 1955a; Pan-Chiu 2002). In other words, the 
principle of complementarity does not contradict the longstanding Aristotelian philosophical 
insight that a ―mutually exclusive nature cannot coexist within the same entity at the same time‖ 
(Park 1967; Pan-Chiu 2002). In contrast, Theise and Kafatos
 
(2013) maintain that there is also an 
ontological level of Bohr‘s understanding of complementarity as he believed that the 
complementarity that was inherent in experimental research of the quantum world was a 
reflection of a more universal and fundamental complementarity, one that reflects in biological 
systems.   
Many consider complementarity as Bohr‘s most significant contribution to the 
interpretation of QM. Some of Bohr‘s contemporaries, such as Pauli (Camilleri 2007), suggested 
that modern quantum theory should be called the ―Theory of Complementarity‖. Others, such as 
philosopher and physicist Mario Bunge (Bunge 1955b), criticize Bohr‘s subjective-idealistic 
causal interpretations of complementarity-based QM (Copenhagen interpretation). He has argued 
that the usual understanding of QM is neither the only possible rational one nor agrees with 
scientific materialism but is consistent with the Berkeleian theory of knowledge. At first (in the 
introduction to the Como lecture), Bohr‘s idea was to use complementarity to deal with 
stationary states problems. He did not intend to use complementarity to deal with mutually 
exclusive experimental arrangements – this foremost moment scholars have tended to ignore 
(Camilleri 2007). In this vital lecture that changed the face of physics and science, Bohr 
employed complementarity to discuss the relationship between the atom‘s stationary state, 
characterized by its energy, and the determination of the electron‘s position in space at a given 
time (Camilleri 2007). For example, a free particle, e.g. an electron, may also be used to 
demonstrate the use of the principle of complementarity (Pan-Chiu 2002). It is well-known that 
―wave‖ and ―particle‖ are mutually exclusive concepts in classical physics. According to the 
knowledge obtained in optics and electromagnetics, reflection, refraction, diffusion, and 




In contrast, a particle occupying a specific space in or around the atom does not possess 
these characteristics. Furthermore, physicists noticed that in some experiments light ―behaves‖ 
like a wave. In contrast, in others, it behaves as a particle, thus suggesting that the concepts of 
classical physics (―wave‖ and ―particle‖) cannot adequately explain the quantum world. For this 
reason, some physicists suggested abandoning the use of these concepts in the quantum realm 
(Pan-Chiu 2002). However, contrary to this view, Bohr insisted that we should keep them no 
matter how hard it would be to explain quantum phenomena in terms of classical physics (Pan-
Chiu 2002).  
Furthermore, the application of complementarity in quantum physics requires the 
implementation of mutually separate experimental arrangements. Indeed, according to Camilleri 
(Camilleri 2007, p.518), a good connoisseur of Bohr‘s work, it was only after 1935 Bohr would 
emphasize that in quantum mechanics (Bohr 1937, p. 293): 
            We [must] use two different experimental arrangements, of which the only one permits 
the unambiguous use of the concept of position, while only the other permits the 
application of the concept of momentum, defined as it is solely by the laws of 
conservation.  
Over the years, Bohr‘s view of complementarity evolved. While at first complementarity 
was seen through primary epistemological lenses, during the 1930s, Bohr moves on to consider 
the use of complementarity in solving the research problems of science (Bohr 1937; McKaughan, 
2005; Domondon 2006). This paradigm shift coincided with Bohr‘s influence on a radical 
change of view about living organisms and biology during the ‘30s and ‘40s. He was one of three 
(the other two were Max Delbrück and Erwin Schrodinger) physicists involved in establishing 
molecular biology (Domondon 2006). He had a compelling scientific and philosophical influence 
on the development of Max Delbrück‘s view of complementarity. In particular, Niels Bohr‘s 
1932 ―Light and Life‖ lecture shaped his lifelong search for a form of complementarity in 
biology (McKaughan 2005). Max Delbrück, in collaboration with geneticists Nikolai Timoféeff-
Ressovsky, and radiation physicist Karl G. Zimmer, published an article entitled ―On the Nature 
of Gene Mutation and Gene Structure‖, also known as Three-man paper (3MP) in 1935 
(Timoféeff-Ressovsky et al. 1935).
 
We believe that some scholars read this paper as a 
contribution to the reductionist project in science and molecular biology development. Still, a 
careful reading reveals that the authors suggest two different ways of viewing biological 
processes. While the first analyzes the organism and its processes in parts and in isolated 
laboratory settings, the second way, at least heuristically, sees these processes as integrated and 
complimentary events crucial to the organism‘s functioning as a whole (McKaughan 2011).  
In subsequent decades, undoubtedly, complementarity inspired scientists and 
philosophers to seriously reconsider our comprehensive understanding of reality in its entirety. 





2013) and social ecology (Alrøe and Noe 2016), this 
principle fuels debates in theology and philosophy of religion (Pan-Chiu 2002). 




Even in quantum-mechanical discussions, philosophers and physicists have emphasized the need 
for a general form of complementarity (see, for instance, Wootters and Zurek 1979). In the 
context of establishing a broader form of complementarity applicable outside physics, the 
discussion between instrumentalists (see, for instance, Faye (2012) and realists (see, for example, 
Folse 1985) is particularly significant (Shomar 2008). Recently, as noted in the introduction 
section, philosopher Towfic Shomar (2008, 2020) made a considerable effort to establish a 
general form of this principle. Shomar holds that the apparent confusion between 
instrumentalists and realists, which prevents the extensive use of complementarity throughout 
scientific practice, arises because philosophers fail to recognize Bohr as a realist of a particular 
kind. Unlike instrumentalist and ―classical‖ realist accounts, the realist phenomenology considers 
this principle outside the limits of ―mutual exclusiveness‖ in a more ―bottom-up‖ experimental 
spirit. For as Shomar observes (Shomar 2020, p. 406):  
            ―The notion of complementarity covers three levels of scientific practice: (1) the mutual 
exclusion of two experimental setups, (2) the mutual exclusion of modes of description, 
and (3) the mutual exclusion of pictures (the ways nature is revealed to us) combining, in 
the quantum system, the two classical properties of elementary particles: waves and 
particles.‖ 
Furthemore, Shomar (2020) suggests that these three levels can be related to the elements needed 
to build a phenomenological model. However, although Bohr initially did not have available the 
mathematical equipment required to build a model, he later found this in Heisenberg‘s 
uncertainty principle. Notably, a phenomenological model, according to Shomar, consists of 
(Shomar 2020, p. 406): 
             ―1) a low-level mathematical representation; 2) a story which can relate such low-level 
mathematical representation with the real elements of the phenomena; and 3) some 
boundary conditions. These components can be expressed in the case of complementarity 
as follows: 1) the uncertainty principle is the mathematical base for complementarity; 2) 
Bohr‘s elaborate story of the necessity of using classical language, leading to the idea of 
complementarity; 3) the quantum of action and the resulting but uncontrollable 
interaction with the measuring instruments that set the boundary conditions of each 
individual phenomenon.  
In this regard, any theoretical description in Bohr‘s view, continues Shomar, if it should be 
accepted as a representation of the phenomenon, and not as a tool, ought to be built on a 
―bottom-up‖ approach. In other words, experiments and experience should be the foundation of 
any theoretical description, rather than a ―top-down‖ approach commonly used by, for example, 
Albert Einstein and other hardcore theoretical physicists. We can only speculate how Bohr came 
to this understanding; perhaps his lifelong interest in experimental physics and biology helped 
him in the process. 
Unfortunately, aside from Bohr, Max Delbrück, and a few other philosophers, particular 




half of the 20th century (Theise and Kafatos
 
2013). However, as already indicated, at the 
beginning of the 21
st
-century, Mazzocchi (2010), Theise and Kafatos
 
(2013), complexity thinkers 
and scientists, re-actualized the possibility of using this principle in complexity-inspired 
biomedical sciences.  
In their view, complementarity should be readmitted and reconceptualized from the 
ground to articulate distinct viewpoints and research strategies found in the biological domain. 
Nonetheless, they contend that complementarity may resolve many current biological theory 
problems, including the relationship between proximate and ultimate causes, analysis, synthesis, 
noise, the epistemology of complexity, etc. Mazzocchi even considers complementarity as a 
general epistemological principle, which can compensate for the human perceptive, 
communicative, cognitive, and linguistic limits. In science, claims Mazzocchi (Mazzocchi 2010, 
p. 343): 
            An epistemology that incorporates the notion of complementarity should be able to 
overcome the idea of an all-inclusive representation and acknowledge the several 
viewpoints and distinct levels of explanation that might be required for the understanding 
of a given phenomenon.  
For Theise and Kafatos (2013), biology and medicine should rely more on describing the 
multilevel interactions between system constituents, working together in complementary 
relationships similar to quantum physics situations. Thus, in addition to Mazzocchi‘s 
epistemological considerations of complementarity in biology, they began and concluded within 
what Bohr labels, in the context of physics, an ontological dimension of complementarity: 
(Theise and Kafatos 2013, p. 19):  
            As limits of knowledge or horizons of knowledge are approaches, through the application 
of nonlinearity in complexity theory, complementarity will be viewed as a fundamental 
cornerstone and necessity of life itself.  
In this sense, we could even call Theise and Kafatos‘ stance as being ―ontological‖ or 
perhaps ―optimistic‖. An optimistic view here is opposed to the skeptical view about the human 
mind‘s limited capacity to explain the extraordinary complexity of the living world. Limited 
cognitive and computational abilities, which prevent us from identifying in the biological domain 
universal laws such as in physics or chemistry, interfere with a profound understanding of 
complex biological systems. In this light, the search for conceptual tools, which can help us think 
more efficiently about biocomplexity, is the holy grail of post-reductionist complexity-inspired 
science. One of these tools is complementarity, whose relevance for today‘s research and clinical 
interventions need yet to be proven.  
So far, discussions seem to support the idea that the general form of complementarity 
might be central to a better understanding of biocomplexity. However, biology, medicine, and 
neuroscience are primarily practical sciences. Therefore, complementarity must find a strong 
refuge in both ―classical‖ and automated experimentation (modeling) as the two most important 




Radder 2009). We do not think that even the first steps have been taken to strengthen this 
principle‘s use in daily research. In particular, the use of this principle has not been examined 
from the aspect of modeling the activity of some of the molecular components of the brain, such 
as ion channels.  
Moreover, assessing this principle‘s use-value in biomedicine requires thorough 
verification and validation within complex and diverse biomedical research practices. This 
practical verification is an essential pre-step underlying the introduction of this principle to 
complexity-inspired biomedicine. However, confronting complementarity with the real-life 
biomedical lab is missing in the literature.  
 
3 Rethinking the fundamental assumptions of ion channel behavior  
Classical and quantum physics should provide an explanatory framework for studying 
biological systems (Koch and Hepp 2006). But there is a catch. These two significant 
contemporary physics areas stand at the opposite spectrum of our most profound understandings 
of nature. For example, classical physics is often associated with determinism, while quantum 
mechanics is fundamentally indeterministic (Koch and Hepp 2006). Also, this means that the 
brain‘s physiology might utilize both deterministic and indeterministic principles. But the big 
question is whether the available empirical knowledge about brain behavior supports this 
reasoning. 
According to young and still controversial quantum neurobiology, the central nervous 
system (CNS) quantum processes determine the diverse brain functions such as consciousness, 
memory, subjective experiences, and the processes of choice and decision-making (Tarlaci and 
Pregnolato 2016; Jedlicka 2017).  It is also thought that experimental and theoretical focusing on 
the determinism/indeterminism issue should give us a clue whether the brain operates according 
to deterministic principles or perhaps is subject to chance events or stochasticity (Weber 2005). 
These insights, among other things, questions the validity of experimental and computational 




(2005) introduced two methodological means used to test the brain‘s 
quantum indeterministic behavior. The first approach is based on the grounds of theoretical QM 
considerations relevant to neurobiological processes. The latter uses proper experimental 
knowledge about the brain. In the first strategy, we should prove that QM processes are directly 
responsible for significant biological phenomena. For example, he cited Robert Brandon and 
Scott Carson‘s scenario where the fate of an entire bacterial population might depend on a single 
mutational event. A fundamental assumption in this example is that a DNA mutation can be 
subject to quantum indeterminism.  
In the other approach, the brain‘s quantum behavior is sought in the empirical facts about 
the CNS‘s functioning. Weber‘s argumentation to justify this second approach seems to lie in the 
fact that experimental neurobiology appears to be exciting for several reasons. First, the logical 




to this understanding (Weber 2005, p.666), ―any change in an organism‘s mental or biological 
properties requires a concomitant change in its physical properties‖. Second, the critical point of 
Weber‘s argument is that if supervenience holds, then for a biological process to show intrinsic 
stochasticity or indeterministic behavior, it must be based on stochastic microphysical 
(biomolecular) processes. Molecular realizers such as photoreceptors, pre-and postsynaptic 
receptors, the voltage- and ligand-gated ion channel, and molecular diffusion processes are 
perhaps the only molecular sources of macroscopic biological stochasticity (Weber 2005). In 
other words, the observed stochastic behavior of these molecular components and processes 
underpins the brain‘s quantum indeterminism.  
Are there hard shreds of evidence to suggest the indeterministic behavior of particular 
molecular processes in nerve cells, including ion channel activity? So far, many neuroscientific 
papers have described what appears to be physiologically appropriate stochastic behavior of 
complex neural processes, including neurotransmission and action potential (AP) generation 
(Roy and Llinás 2009; O‘Donnell and Rossum 2014; Kavalali 2015; Epstein et al. 2016). For 
instance, based on relevant scientific findings, Kavalali
 
(2015) noted that spontaneous 
neurotransmission has an autonomous role in interneuronal communication, quite distinct from 
AP-induced release. The critical macromolecular machinery underlying presynaptic 
neurotransmission is the cytoskeleton of the presynaptic neurons. In 1994 Penrose (Penrose and 
Hameroff‘s hypothesis) proposed that the microtubules, filamentous protein polymers that form 
the cells‘ cytoskeleton, implement quantum computations (Penrose 1994; Weber 2005; Koch and 
Hepp 2006). Indeterminists often cited this hypothesis to prove the quantum nature of 
neurotransmitters release (Weber 2005; Koch and Hepp 2006). However, according to current 
knowledge, the cytoskeleton is involved in delivering vesicles to the synapse, not in the 
neurotransmitters‘ release mechanism (Weber 2005; Kavalali 2015). Indeed, the presynaptic 
active zone recruits and docks synaptic vesicles loaded with specific neurotransmitters to their 
future sites of release, close to highly-localized presynaptic calcium channels (Wong and Kaeser 
2014). To make things even more complicated, synaptic terminals can release neurotransmitters 
randomly in the absence of stimuli due to low-probability conformational changes in the vesicle 
fusion machinery (Kavalali 2015). Besides, extensive scientific studies reveal differences in 
release probability between different synaptic vesicles within the same presynaptic axonal 
terminal (Körber and Kuner 2016). All these findings indeed cast doubts on Penrose and 
Hameroff‘s quantum hypothesis.  
One of the most considerable arguments cited to support the thesis of quantum neuro-
indeterminism comes from the apparent stochastic behavior of neural ion channels, which 
underpins AP generation and propagation. For example, Roy and Llinas
 
(2009) argued that the 
Nelson process (the time-reversible Markov process associated with Schrödinger equation) used 
to describe ionic channel permeation could, indeed, be considered an intermediate between 





) ion channels underlie AP generation and propagation in neurons. However, 




regulate the physical characteristics of AP, including the response to synaptic input (Milescu 
2015). Some modeling studies suggest that ion channels‘ stochastic noise is, directly or 
indirectly, responsible for spontaneous AP (spike) generation, information processing, spike time 
reliability, firing irregularity, etc. (O‘Donnell and van Rossum  2014; Goldwyn and Shea-Brown 
2011). This random stochastic fluctuation appears in the absence of neurotransmission and 
subsequent voltage changes across membranes. Yet, experimental and theoretical neuroscientists 
still disagree on how noise affects single neuron dynamics and which ion channel type is 
primarily responsible for its occurrence (O‘Donnell and van Rossum  2014). At this time, we can 
only speculate how far we are from understanding the implications of stochastic ion channel 
fluctuations on integrative brain behavior. 
Nevertheless, indeterminists cite these data to support their thesis that single-channel 
quantum behavior directly affects the brain‘s higher functions. Overall, the use of neurochemical 
transmission and ion channel behavior data as arguments for QM-based neurobiological 
indeterminism is not as promising as it seemed at first glance (Weber 2005; Koch and Hepp 




            Two key biophysical operations underlie information processing in the brain: chemical 
transmission across the synaptic cleft, and the generation of action potentials. These both 
involve thousands of ions and neurotransmitter molecules, coupled by diffusion or by the 
membrane potential that extends across tens of micrometers. Both processes will destroy 
any coherent quantum states. Thus, spiking neurons can only receive and send classical 
rather than quantum information. It follows that a neuron either spikes at a particular 
point in time or it does not, but is not in a superposition of spike and non-spike states. 
This section‘s discussion is very important for understanding the physical (quantum) nature of 
neurobiological processes. However, considering that our focus here is on modeling strategies to 
explain nerve cell behavior, we should examine in more detail if and how computational models 
of ion channel activity simultaneously incorporate deterministic and stochastic solutions in their 
core. 
 
4 Promises and difficulties in ion channel modeling 
 
Thanks to the progress made in experimental, computational, and mathematical 
neuroscience, much of the attention in brain research has been paid to understand how neurons 
process information (Koch and Schutter 1999; Scott 2007). However, less attention has been 
paid to understand how these growing interdisciplinary efforts at the intersection of biology, 
physics, mathematics, computational science, and chemistry may be used to test the practical 
usefulness of recently rediscovered theoretical principles such as complementarity for 
neuroscience. This specific research domain may answer whether it is possible to use Bohr‘s 
complementarity in daily research or whether philosophers and scientists should continue to 




As we have already seen, according to the ―mutual exclusiveness of experimental setups‖  
form of Bohr‘s complementarity, when the experiments involve mutually opposed concepts, it 
makes sense to use this principle only to concepts belonging to or arising from the separate 
experimental occasions. For this reason, according to this narrow view, we speculate, it is 
impossible to use this principle in the same model if that model combines two extremely 
opposing conceptual frameworks, such as determinism and stochasticism (indeterminism). A 
more detailed analysis of the research practice and relevant modeling results will confirm or 
reject our thesis.  
Both stochastic (indeterministic) and deterministic models are currently used in modeling 
ion channel activity. Many of these models have been proven suitable for certain aspects of ion 
channel behavior. Below we will mention only some of the most critical models. The most 
common indeterministic model is the aggregated continuous-time Markov process with discrete 
states (Goldwyn et al. 2011; Epstein et al. 2016). A Markov model describes the dynamics of 
biological processes quantitatively by assuming that a set of discrete states transits through time 
from one state to another (Linaro and Giugliano 2015). It is believed that Markov chain models 
can successfully describe stochastic spiking activity (Goldwyn et al. 2011). But before Markov 
chain models were introduced, the dominant cellular neurophysiology model was the Hodgkin-
Huxley (HH) model of nerve excitability. When the HH model was proposed in the 1950s, it 
failed to capture ion channel noise fluctuations and a far more complex (and higher-dimensional) 
description of channels‘ chaotic behavior (Goldwyn and Shea-Brown 2011). In the last decades, 
tremendous efforts have been made to revise the canonical HH model in the light of 
deterministic chaos theory. Goldwyn and Shea-Brown
 
(2011) argued that many of these 
approaches produce quantitative errors compared to physic-chemical kinetic equations; These 
equations are the natural setting for describing conductances and thus a perfect tool for 
predicting fluctuations in conductances and stochasticity in the resulting AP. Although the 
dominant effort is to bridge the HH model and chaos theory, some researchers continue to devise 
stochastic solutions in the HH model. For instance, Ronald Fox
 
(1997) extended the HH 
equations to include stochastic solutions. 
It is important to note that the models and modeling strategies might give us a clue to 
assess whether neurons and, ultimately, the brain behaves deterministically or 
indeterministically. For instance, Marcel Weber
 
(2005) argued that the experimental evidence to 
prove neurobiological indeterminism fails because both deterministic and indeterministic models 
can account for ion channels‘ empirically observed behavior. Indeed, the use of nonlinear 
modeling negates the idea that ion channels operate exclusively by chance events. Also, it was 
shown by many studies that the slight variation of initial nonlinear model parameters might result 
in the unpredictable behavior of these channels (Guckenheimer and Oliva 2002; Mendonca et al. 
2016). To illustrate this point, let us look at the following example. In addition to the direct effect 
of stochastic channel noise, specific nonlinear deterministic processes underpin the time-
dependent irregular spiking activity of cortical neurons (Mendonca et al. 2016). It depends on the 




around the action potential threshold (Mendonca et al. 2016). However, a literature survey 
suggests that most synaptic integration models based on ion channel activity appear to be 
deterministic (Dudman and Nolan 2009). Besides, Guckenheimer and Oliva
 
(2002) demonstrate 
a previously unknown aspect of the HH model: unstable, chaotic solutions, even with its original 
parameters. 




demonstrated the consistency of the deterministic and 
stochastic processes predicted by the HH model. He shows that in a suitable limit, as the 
stochastic components of the stochastic model increase and their contributions decrease, they 
converge to the trajectory predicted by the HH model‘s deterministic equations. In a more 
general way, Steinmetz, Manwani and Koch express observed  consistency and convergence 
between stochastic and deterministic predictions of the HH model (Steinmetz et al. 2001, p. 91):   
            The stochastic Markov version of the HH model converges to the classical, deterministic 
model as the number of channels grows large, but for realistic channel numbers, the 
stochastic model can exhibit a wide variety of behaviors (spontaneous spiking, bursting, 
chaos, and so on) that cannot be observed in deterministic model. 
 These findings support the idea that both deterministic and probabilistic aspects of ion 
channels‘ behavior can be represented in single neurons‘ information processing model. Thus, 
Austin‘s model that includes both stochastic and deterministic processes can provide much better 
and more detailed predictions of how ion channels generate and modulate AP. Steinmetz, 
Manwani and Koch
 
(2001) also defend the advantages of combining deterministic and stochastic 
models in predicting ion channel activity. Moreover, deterministic and stochastic solutions 
offered by the reformed HH model could be used, among other proofs, to test the applicability of 
Bohr‘s complementarity to some ion channel modeling efforts. We will return to this problem 
later in section 5. 
There are other advantages of nonlinear deterministic models in explaining the 
empirically observed behavior of ion channels. The ion channel interactions with the nerve cell‘s 
multimolecular machinery and the preexisting functional status of pre-and postsynaptic terminals 
are two critical events that may cause changes in their activity. Now, this claim is substantiated 
by many research studies. For instance, researchers reported that clustered patterns of spikes 
(AP), as a part of the stochastic model of stellate neurons (inhibitory neurons found in the 
cerebellum), are driven by activation of hyperpolarization-activated cyclic nucleotide-gated 
(HCN) channels (Dudman and Nolan 2009). To simplify, the previous activation of HCN 
channels increases the likelihood of subsequent AP generation and propagation in stellate 





 ions, and their activation is facilitated by cyclic adenosine monophosphate (cAMP) 
(Benarroch 2013). This contradicts stochastic Markov models, which assume that ion channels 




Besides, there is a problem with the efficiency and predictability of both deterministic 




preexisting physiological conditions, it is also challenging to describe ion channel dynamics in a 
broader sense. In short, it is the biological context or boundary conditions that significantly 
complicate the modeling of the physiological processes. These deterministic and indeterministic 
simulations may give good predictions about some aspects of ion channel gating dynamics and 
individual neuronal computations. Still, they fail to reproduce all the critical contextual factors 
(boundary conditions) that may affect the behavior of single neurons and macroscopic neural 
networks, including top-down information processing in the brain (Herz et al. 2006; Gerstner et 
al. 2012). Considering that the brain is a nonlinear dynamical complex system with many 
feedback loops, its mathematical modeling and representations are challenging (Scott 2007; 
Jedlicka 2017). Many representative models, such as Austin‘s improved deterministic HH model, 
ignore possible external effects acting upon axons. Austin
 
(2008) wonders whether this 
convergence between stochasticism and determinism is sustainable when many stimuli are 
projected on that same axon. More specifically, Austin raises the question of what would happen 
with convergence when the signals arrive from the soma along the axon or a trans-membrane 
current along the axon‘s length because these stimuli could be deterministic or stochastic. He 
concludes that one could expect that the stochastic model converges to his improved 
deterministic HH model‘s trajectory in the former case. In the case of stochastic stimuli, even the 
limit model would have stochastic components. Therefore, as already mentioned, Austin‘s model 
can resolve many possible scenarios and give better predictions. However, what happens when 
many integrated stimuli that arrive in a more extended period are considered or when numerous 
cellular mechanisms modulate ionic activity? It is known that many networks of complex 
signaling pathways (for instance, G-protein coupled receptor signaling cascades) are involved in 
axonal voltage-gated ion channel modulation that, in return, affect AP initiation and propagation, 
and thus the release of neurotransmitters (Burke and Bender 2019). 
Precisely, this challenge questions the entire epistemological and technological 
infrastructure available today to interact with the repertoire of ion channel different dynamic 
states, including their interactions with the cellular mechanism which regulate their activity. In 
this case, scientists would need supercomputers and considerable resources to model these 
bonding interactions. In philosophical terminology, perhaps the concept of epistemological 
probabilism can best describe this situation. Accordingly, neuro-indeterminism arises when we 
fail to explain the interactions between billions of neurons and an even more significant number 
of their molecular constituents, including ion channels (Weber 2005). Epistemological 
probabilism reflects our limited cognitive and computational capacity to study the brain as the 
most complex structure in the universe (Weber 2005). Perhaps, if this account of probabilism is 
correct, then indeterminists might lose ontological support for their views. In the absence of 
cognitive and technical solutions to deal with complex interactions between the brain‘s 
constituents, we will hardly distinguish the ontological probabilism woven into the very fabric of 
space and time from the epistemological one that results from our limited ways of interacting 
with the brain. If, by any chance, we succeed in discerning between our cognitive limitations and 




question. However, these issues go deep into the realm of scientific realism, which we will not 
discuss here because that is not our goal. Our cognitive (in)ability to understand complex brain 
dynamics has a significant share when deciding between determinism vs. indeterminism and 
corresponding modeling strategies. Also, resolving the determinism/indeterminism distinction 
would be hard to imagine without questioning the effectiveness and validity of ion channels‘ 
computational models.  
To sum up, judging from the above considerations, neuroscientific research often requires 
integrating distinct modeling solutions in the same model. More precisely, the modeling 
representation of the same phenomena, such as ion channel activity, needs deterministic and 
stochastic approaches to ensure predictability, validity, and objectivity. This recognition leads us 
to ask ourselves how to accommodate these opposing modeling strategies to ensure a smooth 
research process. Perhaps, complementarity may seem like an excellent means of achieving this 
goal. However, we fear that complementarity might not be up to this task if used and interpreted 
only through the ―mutual exclusiveness of experimental setups‖ form. 
 
5 Complementarity in ion channel modeling? 
The question remains: What about using complementarity for closing the gap between 
deterministic and indeterministic strategies used in ion channel modeling? What are the above 
examples telling us?  
According to Bohr, we need complementarity in a situation when two mutually exclusive 
perspectives or approaches are both right, necessary in a particular context, and not contradictory 
as they arise in mutually exclusive conditions (mutually exclusive experimental setups) (Bohr 
1928; Bunge 1955a; Holton 1988; Roll-Hansen 2000). The deterministic and stochastic modeling 
solutions used in cellular neurophysiology are both right and necessary in a particular context. 
However, their combined use quite often occurs in mutually nonexclusive situations, in a single 
experimental arrangement. This observation contradicts the narrow understanding of 
complementarity we provide at the beginning of this paper. The main reason for this notion is 
that some scientists and philosophers consider complementarity a ―top-down‖ tool to deal with 
mutually exclusive experimental arrangements in quantum physics (see Shomar 2008). As Bunge 
noticed, when we have an experimental setup for determining one feature, we destroy the 
possibility of setting up a complementary experimental arrangement that would allow us to 
assess its conjugate attribute (Bunge 1955a). In the meantime, scientists have discovered that ion 
channels‘ measurable activity can, to some extent, exhibit quantum behavior. However, these 
quantum effects are still somewhat ―lost‖ in the cellular environment and ―masked‖ by 
deterministic macroscopic processes. For this reason, it is sometimes necessary to assume the 
deterministic and indeterministic behavior of ion channels in the same experimental condition. 
Bohr could not have had such knowledge at the time when he introduced complementarity to 




On the contrary, our study shows that quite often, mutually opposed experimental 
(modeling) arrangements in neuroscience are not separated. More precisely, there are cases when 
deterministic and indeterministic models are used separately. Still, ion channel researchers do not 
hesitate to simultaneously use opposing deterministic and indeterministic solutions in the same 




paper. These authors confirmed that a model that accounts for stochastic noise in ion channels 
could be nicely combined with models describing nonlinear deterministic processes of irregular 
spiking activity of cortical neurons. Therefore, two opposite models are used to predict 
macroscopic spiking activity produced by the operation of thousands of ion channels. 
Furthermore, attempts to prove the consistency of chaotic and stochastic aspects of the improved 




(2008) also support our claim that two 
utterly different conceptual frameworks could be combined in the same modeling setup. 
However, from our examples, we have also seen that even this versatile and integrative modeling 
practice is not enough sometimes to provide us with a thorough understanding of the molecular 
physiology of ion channels, mainly when the function of these channels is observed in a broader 
biological context. 
The simultaneous use of conceptually distinct and opposed models in computational 
neurophysiology, which are expected to be used in entirely different and separated experimental 
settings, is becoming neuroscience‘s daily practice. In other words, many models of ion channel 
activity combine deterministic and stochastic solutions, quite the opposite of how Bohr perceived 
quantum experimentation in the ‘20s and ‘30s. Seemingly from Bohr‘s ―mutual exclusiveness of 
experimental setups‖  perspective, it would not be possible to consolidate a single experimental 
arrangement that would simultaneously determine mutually opposed global attributes of ion 
channel behavior. More precisely, the combined use of deterministic and indeterministic 
solutions in the same experimental or modeling setup would result in a contradiction. But based 
on the above examples, this obstacle in no way interferes with researchers‘ determination to use 
both solutions in the same ion channel activity model. 
Moreover, thanks to Shomar‘s (Shomar 2008, 2020) ―bottom-up‖ realist 
phenomenological approach, Bohr‘s complementarity can be deployed to present a descriptive 
account of ion channel activity using two mathematical models. As Bohr says: ―regardless of 
what is the reality of the ‗objects-out-there‘, the reality that we can account for is that of two 
descriptions that can be presented in a complementary way‖. Shomar‘s realist position set aside 
―mutual exclusivity of experimental setups‖ as the only correct interpretation of Bohr‘s 
complementarity. In fact, without going into whether the ―objective‖ nature of the opening of ion 
channels is stochastic or deterministic, the practice of modeling these channels suggests that 
there is no mutual exclusion of modes of description of their activity. Thanks to realist 
phenomenological understanding, we think it is possible to go beyond the ―mutual exclusivity of 
experimental setups‖ version of complementarity that limits its applications in our case. This 
notion is fundamental considering that one crucial research area of complexity-inspired biology, 




organization based on interacting components at lower levels to be its primary epistemological 
and methodological goal (see Bruggeman 2007; Noble 2012). 
Nevertheless, the simultaneous use of opposing experimental arrangements is not an 
exception in neuroscience reserved only for ion channel modeling. For example, 
neurophysiologists often combine opposing linear and nonlinear measures to the 
electroencephalographic (EEG) signals collected from the same experimental condition (Kesić 
and Spasić 2016). While the system‘s proportional responses account for linearity, 
disproportionality between input and output specifies nonlinearity and the corresponding 
nonlinear analysis of EEG. Most importantly, modern ―complexity theory‖, which lacks 
universal consensus
 
(Chu et al. 2003), combines different opposing theoretical principles, 
including linearity and nonlinearity. Some of these other conceptual and research frameworks 
used to interact with the complex organism are ―bottom-up‖ and ―top-down‖ systems biology, 
reductionism, holism, systems-theoretical biology, pragmatic systems biology, the epistemology 
of complexity, etc. (Mazzocchi 2008; 2010; 2011; Bruggeman et al. 2007; Noble 2012; Kesić 
2019). Attempting to unite as many approaches and ideas as possible, previously thought to be 
an impossible task, stimulates interest in studying living complex systems. It encourages 
scientists to incorporate different principles and strategies and increases their expectations to 
legitimize existing and acquire new comprehensive research data.  
In this articulation process between the parts and the whole, opposing theoretical 
principles, research object, and the researcher, complementarity may play a key role (Mazzocchi 
2010). However, the principle must go through a kind of departure from the ―mutual 
exclusiveness of experimental setups‖ to increase its usability range to capture opposing 
concepts in the single experimental setup. We believe that various theoretical and practical 
frameworks such as Morin‘s complex thinking can assist philosophers and scientists in searching 
for the general form of complementarity.  
Noteworthy, Complex thinking does not necessarily imply that ―everything is complex‖, 
meaning ―what cannot be understood‖. In other words, complex thinking as a conceptual tool 
allows scientists to articulate the whole and the parts simultaneously, to distinguish complex 
from complicated and contingency from determinism (Ferrara 2010; Morin 2014; de Melo 
2020). It provides a combination of several factors at the same time (Ferrara 2010, p. 3): 
            Where principles of regulation and non-equilibrium are combined, where contingency 
and determinism, order and disorder are; where levels of the organization and nonlinear 
dynamics can be identified by feedback between the levels.  
As a coupling mode between the world and observer, Complex thinking informs the 
development and coordination of new tools and strategies to support the practice and evaluation 
of Complex thinking across natural, biological, and social domains (de Melo 2020, p. 34):  
            It produces further information through the creation of differences: (i) one‘s own state in 
relation to the World/System; (ii) the emergent view of the world, and the system-of-




organization of the relationship between the observer and the world and the experience of 
its effects. The creation of this information may lead to changes in the thinking and, in 
turn, lead to more differentiated and integrated perspectives, offering more possibilities 
for effective action through a more congruent coupling.  
According to Complex thinking, in principle, no logical obstacles interfere with the 
simultaneous use of concepts such as determinism and indeterminism in the same experimental 
setting. The reason is simple; the simultaneous differentiation and integration of a complex 
system‘s properties happen in the observer‘s mind, which is then transferred to scientists‘ 
practical actions. In this way, the differences between the stochastic and deterministic behavior 
of ion channels are recognized in the observer‘s mind while simultaneously searching for 
integrative mathematical and computer solutions that would minimize these differences. Thus, 
we suspect that Bohr‘s complementarity comprehended in a purely theoretical and antirealist 
manner cannot turn differentiation and integration into a single valid experiment or model 
consisting of opposing solutions.  
On the contrary, complementarity‘s phenomenological framework may account for 
simultaneous differentiation and integration similarly to Complex thinking. The use of these two 
principles together, however, can intensify efforts towards the reconciliations between profound 
dualities scientists encounter across biological theory and practice. In this respect, Mazzocchi‘s, 
Theise‘s and Kafato‘s appeal for generalized complementarity and extensive use of conceptual 
tools such as Complex thinking to accommodate 21st-century biology are pretty justified. 
 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has suggested a general form of  Bohr‘s complementarity to meet 21st-century 
ion channel modeling demands. However, scientists and philosophers should take the proper 
philosophical interpretations of this principle and examine its relevance for current scientific 
research before any applications in practice occur. Our study, at least, provides much-needed 
empirical support to understand how neurophysiologists may exploit complementarity to 
facilitate everyday research tasks. Hence, some of the modeling-related experiments presented in 
our paper indicate a more general form of complementarity.  
Combining deterministic and indeterministic solutions in the same ion channel model is 
the most crucial landmark of today‘s computational neurophysiology. Based on deterministic or 
indeterministic solutions, these channel models are correct and necessary in a particular context 
and are expected to be part of separate modeling setups. However, according to this paper‘s 
results, some of these models simultaneously include opposing solutions. This state of the matter 
reduces the complementarity principle‘s application domain in this particular brain modeling 
area, or so it seems at first glance. In this respect, we hold that the narrow ―mutual exclusivity of 
experimental setups‖ version of Bohr‘s complementarity limits its application to ion channel 
modeling practices. Hence, if we adopt this interpretation of principle as only valid, it would be 




However, a practically-oriented realist phenomenological position opens space for a more 
general complementarity suitable for diverse experimental and modeling applications, including 
neuroscience. 
The paper‘s other important finding is the suggested joint use of complementarity and 
Complex thinking. The first allows the use of seemingly different ―bottom-up‖ solutions in a 
single model, while the second forms a bridge between different conceptual frameworks used to 
frame that model. Even so more, as Rychlak (1993) argued in the field of psychology, 
complementarity enters at the formulative point of a scientific investigation, even before 
experiments are designed and conducted. The similar applies to neurophysiology; in addition, we 
argue, this also might be said for Complex thinking. 
Although this paper explores the limits of applying complementarity in modeling 
practice, one can read it as an evidence-based contribution to frame a general form of 
complementarity. Once we consider all the pieces of evidence about the procedures in ion 
channel modeling, we‘re left with one inescapable conclusion. It appears that Bohr‘s 
complementarity might be suitable for ion channel modeling practice and should be further 
accommodated to meet the demands of rapidly expanding computational neuroscience research. 
At the very least, this is possible from the point of view of a realist phenomenology.  
In this paper, we have only superficially touched on this principle‘s use in neuroscience. 
Moreover, considering that this article is a work of conceptual analysis, it is clear that the 
conclusions are drawn from a limited number of examined scientific and philosophical papers. 
Therefore, the claims and statements presented in the article are open for revision, confrontation, 
and further discussion. 
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